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We examine how institutional context affects the decisions
that subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs)
make in pursuing particular human resource management
(HRM) practices in response to institutional duality.
Drawing on Varieties of Capitalism, along with the concept
of intermediate conformity, we argue that the use of
particular HRM practices by MNC subsidiaries will differ
depending on both the combination of home and host
institutional contexts, and on the nature of the particular
practice under consideration. Using data from a survey of
HRM practices in 1196 firms across 10 countries, we
compare HRM practices in subsidiaries located and head-
quartered in different combinations of liberal and/or co-
ordinated market economies. Our study suggests MNC
subsidiaries conform only to the most persuasive norms,
while exercising their agency to take advantage of the
opportunities presented by institutional duality to adopt
practices that distinguish them from indigenous
competitors.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Scholars are increasingly calling attention to the explanatory power of institutional context in accounting for
variations in the use of Human Resource Management (HRM) practices within organisations operating across a
variety of settings (e.g. Paauwe & Farndale, 2017; Schuler & Jackson, 2014). In particular, institutional factors,
commonly referred to as the contextual rules that operate in different settings, enable or constrain the choices
available to organisations regarding HRM (Farndale et al., 2017; Gooderham et al., 2019; Gooderham et al., 2006).
In multinational corporations (MNCs) that operate across diverse ‘home’ and ‘host’ institutional settings and
therefore face compliance pressures from multiple contexts, the need to understand what governs HRM practice is
particularly acute (Poutsma et al., 2006). Referred to as institutional duality, this requirement for MNCs to follow
institutional requirements operating in divergent settings can often generate ‘competing and potentially incom-
patible prescriptions’ (Saka‐Helmhout et al, 2016, pp. 2).
Scholars have offered four key accounts of how MNCs handle institutional duality. First, MNCs may pursue a
localisation or host country approach by choosing practices that are similar to those used by indigenous firms in their
host countries (Brewster, Woods & Brookes, 2008; Brookes et al., 2017; Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). Opting for
such an approach may confer legitimacy on the subsidiary within the host location with that legitimacy referring to
‘the extent to which an entity is appropriate for its social context’ (Tost, 2011, pp. 688–689). Second, MNCs may
opt for standardisation or a country of origin approach where they seek to retain as many of the practices from their
headquarters as possible (Ferner et al, 2013). Such standardisation is pursued in the belief that competitive forces
resulting from markets, industrialisation and technology obviate the influence of varying national cultures (Tre-
gaskis et al., 2001). Third, MNC practices might converge on the dominant US model of management, the so called
best practice approach, regardless of whether these practices are especially common in the home or host country
(Edwards, et al., 2013; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). According to Pudelko and Harzing (2007:540), the pressure to
adapt to the dominant model is so strong that MNCs ‘strive to standardise their practices (across their foreign
subsidiaries)…toward the management model, which represents perceived best practices (dominance effect)’ rather
than those of their home countries. Finally, in what can be characterised as a mixed approach, practices within MNC
subsidiaries sometimes converge and sometimes diverge from the host and home country context depending on the
specific practice in question. For example, Poutsma et al. (2006) find that both host and home country influence the
use of particular bundles of HRM practices depending on the latter's nature. More recently, Farndale, et al. (2017)
extend this view by clarifying that certain HRM practices are more institutionally constrained, relative to others,
and that the choice of HRM practices is less constrained when operating in liberal rather than coordinated market
economies, as they generally have fewer regulations in place.
The cumulative insights from these accounts provide the point of departure for our study. As has been noted
‘significant shortcomings’ remain in our understanding of how MNCs operating across different environments
respond to the institutional duality that they face, so that we still only have a partial understanding of what
determines their choices (Saka‐Helmhout, et al., 2016, p. 2). We explore the ways in which MNCs respond to
competing institutional demands when deciding which HRM practices to implement. This is important in order to
understand how the mix of constraints and opportunities that arise for the MNC from its home and host institu-
tional contexts generate a range of options when it comes to the adoption of particular HRM practices.
In turn, we build on Poutsma et al.’s (2006, p. 515) central observation of the criticality of institutional duality in
determining the use of HRM practices in MNCs. They highlight: ‘In striving to develop consistent organisational
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capabilities, MNCs want their subsidiaries to comply [to the home context]… At the same time, the subsidiary
confronts pressures to adapt to the institutional patterns specific to that domain in the host country.’ However, we
are also mindful of Rana and Morgan's (2019, p. 514) argument that institutions serve not only as mechanisms of
constraint, but also potentially as ‘opportunity providers’.
Rather than examine bundles of HRM practices through a configurational approach (see Poutsma et al., 2006),
we focus on single, discrete HRM practices. While a configurational approach is helpful for unearthing the inter-
dependence between practices in providing positive organisational performance outcomes (Delery & Doty, 1996;
Misangyi et al., 2017), we suggest that when examining the impact of institutional context on the adoption of HRM
practices, this approach makes it more difficult to capture the differences between ostensibly associated practices
in relation to their institutional appropriateness. Thus, in order to further unpack the influence of home and host
institutional context on the use of HRM practices, we favour an approach that examines single practices, each of
which may be subject to different constraints.
We draw on the utility of Farndale et al.’s (2017) argument that, depending on the home and host institutional
environments under consideration, not all HRM practices are necessarily subject to the same constraints. However,
Farndale et al. (2017) focused only on host country effects, while we explicate the combined impact of both home
and host country effects to capture the institutional duality that arises from these two contexts (Witt & Jack-
son, 2016). In order to conceptualise this duality, we draw on the institutional literature, primarily that on
comparative capitalisms and specifically on Hall and Soskice's (2001) Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) classification of
liberal market economics (LMEs; e.g., UK) and coordinated market economies (CMEs; e.g., Germany).
We build on the extant literature in three ways. First, in calling attention to the nature of institutional duality
that arises from MNCs operating in different combinations of LME and CME home and host settings, we underscore
the importance of conceptualising conformity to context as a set of options, rather than a simple ‘either or’ choice.
In this respect, we provide empirical support for the idea of intermediate conformity (Bascle, 2016), developing it
further by disentangling the drivers behind the choice of individual practices, and the nature of the mix of host and
home country practices suggested by other authors (Farndale et al., 2017; Morgan, 2001). Second, we move past
conceptualising duality as simply competing pressures or constraints for institutional isomorphism from the home
and host contexts (Kostova & Roth, 2002) and recognise that duality can also present opportunities for subsidiaries
to break free from practices dictated by their home or host environments.
Third, we extend the prevalent focus in previous studies on MNCs headquartered in LMEs to also incorporate less
frequently investigated MNCs that originate from CMEs. While previous research has examined the impact of LME
MNCs entering another LME or CME, we know relatively little about how MNCs from CMEs act when they enter
different settings. Studying CMEs is particularly important given the heterogeneous nature of contemporary foreign
direct investment patterns in an increasingly diverse range of settings (Child & Marinova, 2014). This enables us to
develop a more comprehensive map of variations in the HRM practices MNCs pursue in their subsidiaries.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. First, we draw on insights from institutional theory to situate
the choices organisations make in seeking to conform with contextual norms and operationalise institutional
settings via the VoC literature to develop a series of hypotheses. Subsequently, we test our arguments using a
large‐scale dataset of MNC subsidiaries employing different collaborative and calculative HRM practices operating
in different LMEs and CMEs. We discuss our key findings in the context of the enfolding literature and highlight the
implications arising from our analysis.
1.1 | Institutional context
Scholars have long emphasised the importance of institutional context in governing practices at the organisational
level (e.g., Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), including in MNCs (e.g., Philips & Tracey, 2009;
Marano & Kostova, 2016; Saka‐Helmhout, et al, 2016). Managerial approaches are influenced by pressures to
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conform to preferred practices and procedures institutionalised in society. More recently referred to as institu-
tional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991), institutions serve to enable or constrain behaviour and the choices that
organisations make (Dacin et al., 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). Organisations seek to comply with the
dominant institutional logics operating in their environment to gain endorsement from important referent
audiences, to understand the social world and thus act confidently within it (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Traditional perspectives emphasise the role of institutional factors primarily as constraints and suggest that
organisations are obliged to comply with all societal norms, values and formal regulations operating within their
institutional context in order to maintain legitimacy. However, some authors have suggested that institutional
contexts can also provide opportunities for MNC subsidiaries (e.g., Morgan, 2017), and that organisations possess a
degree of agency to take a more balanced, strategic, purposive and selective stance towards compliance
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Oliver, 1990). Thus, decisions in relation to practice are rooted in an interplay
between the perceived degree of latitude available to the organisation on the one hand, and the perceived level of
institutional compliance required on the other (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2008).
MNCs are physically dispersed in a range of different institutional settings and therefore are exposed to multiple,
and often competing logics, resulting from different pressures in their home and host environments. They are forced
to engage with multiple logics from across their operating zones, many of which may contain competing prescriptions
which may not be easily reconciled (Bascle, 2016; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The responses
made to conflicting logics can be viewed as conformity struggles between internal and external stakeholders,
struggles which may ultimately affect access to resources and organisational survival (Cloutier & Langley, 2013).
In line with their capacity for achieving a strategic balance in both seeking to respond to institutional re-
quirements and to differentiate themselves from competitors (Deephouse, 1999), and given their status as
powerful players in national business ecosystems, MNCs have some discretion when it comes to conforming to
norms within their host environments (Bascle, 2016; Ferner et al., 2013). This allows them to exercise agency when
conforming to particular norms emanating from their home or host context. In this respect, Kostova et al. (2008, p.
999) observed that ‘MNCs enjoy a rich institutional landscape, being exposed to a multitude of diverse practices
and patterns of activity’ that affords them the ‘discretion to choose patterns that they think fit them best.’
In harmony with this strategic perspective, Bascle (2016) suggests that MNCs may adopt ‘intermediate con-
formity,’ where they accept some norms, but not others within a particular institutional setting. Bascle connects the
level of conformity specifically to proscriptive and prescriptive social norms and their unexplored implications when
organisations attempt to deal with them. Bascle distinguishes those norms for which their rejection is in contra-
diction to the interests of key regulators, as particularly important sources of constraint. Building on this argument,
we suggest that, where feasible and desirable, in order to achieve a strategic balance, an MNC will choose to
conform to particular norms within their home and host institutional settings, while knowingly rejecting others.
1.1.1 | Operationalizing institutional context and HRM practices
A number of mechanisms are offered in extant literature to conceptualise institutional context. Wood et al. (2014)
offer an account of three widely accepted comparative approaches and their merits and shortcomings, namely VoC,
business systems theory (BST) and regulation theory (RT). VoC focuses on short‐ and long‐term relations with
relevant stakeholders, BST focuses on state‐worker and employer‐employee relations, and RT focuses on
competition and finance while addressing power imbalances between capital and labour.
We draw here on what Witt and Jackson (2016) consider the most prominent of these, the VoC framework and
on the distinction between LMEs and CMEs, focussing on different combinations of home and host contexts (Hall &
Soskice, 2001). Previous literature has noted differences in the adoption of HR practices among firms in LMEs and
CMEs and related this to the influence of institutions (Saka‐Helmhout, et al., 2016). We therefore associate market
economy with two different approaches to the direction and alignment of HRM. One is the economic perspective,
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driven primarily by performance and the other is the predominantly humanistic perspective driven by collaboration
and commitment (Poutsma, et al., 2006). The economic perspective approaches HRM as a main contributor to
organisational performance by deploying calculative HRM practices that are more likely in LMEs. In contrast, the
humanistic perspective underlines the importance of employee commitment by deploying collaborative practices,
which are more likely in CMEs (P. N. Gooderham et al., 1999; Poutsma et al., 2006).
In LMEs, firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements; firm
behaviour is driven by demand and supply conditions in competitive markets (Hall & Soskice, 2001). LME logics are
based on the predominant norm of firm autonomy, short‐term returns and maximising shareholder value through
economic gain (Cruz‐Suárez et al., 2014). The absence of particularly imposing norms in these settings means that
organisations face fewer constraints in selecting their HRM practices of choice (Brewster, 1995). Evidence suggests
that these logics primarily espouse an economic efficiency perspective and a focus on calculative HRM practices
(Cristiani, 2019; Poutsma et al., 2006).
Calculative practices such as formal performance appraisal and individual performance related pay aim at
ensuring that each employee's contribution is assessed and rewarded accordingly: this is seen as innate to LMEs as
opposed to CMEs where trade unions resist individualised remuneration (P. N. Gooderham, et al., 1999). Calculative
HRM approaches might also include collective incentive systems, such as employee share schemes. While some
researchers place these practices in a separate category aimed at aligning individual with collective firm interests
(Poutsma et al., 2006), others identify them as calculative because their focus is on employee contributions in
relation to firm performance (Døving & Nordhaug, 2013). In this study, we therefore examine the prevalence of
three core calculative practices widely used in LMEs: formal performance appraisals; individual performance
related pay; and employee share schemes.
Conversely, in CMEs, firms depend more heavily on nonmarket stakeholder relationships including works
councils and trade unions (Farndale et al., 2008). This entails a high level of regulatory coordination and therefore
more constraints than those in LMEs. Thus, firms in CMEs tend to coordinate efforts through long‐term re-
lationships that necessitate mechanisms of collective action (Witt & Jackson, 2016). Logics within a CME are driven
by strong norms of collaboration and commitment at all levels of the organisation (Poutsma et al., 2006) that
manifest themselves in distinctively collaborative HRM practices (P. N. Gooderham, et al., 1999).
Despite their broad commonalities, CMEs exhibit significant variation ‘in relation to the institutional structures
underpinning strategic coordination [that] can have significant effects on corporate strategy…’ (Hall &
Soskice, 2001, pp. 34). This has led some researchers to advise caution in employing such a dichotomous approach
(Edwards et al., 2016) to comparative capitalisms. For example, Brookes et al. (2017, p. 1693) point critically to the
‘very broad, encompassing multiple systemic features’ VoC approach and the diversity within the CME grouping,
necessitating the introduction of a split in Hall and Soskice's CME category into different groupings (e.g., Witt
et al., 2018). However, Hall and Soskice's (2001) research demonstrates that the magnitude of difference between
LMEs and CMEs is more substantial than the differences between the various economic types within the CME
category. In a similar vein, Witt and Jackson (2016, p. 780) provided evidence to support the validity of the broad
CME and LME clusters among industrialised nations, concluding that the VoC framework ‘continues to have a
uniquely powerful hold.’ Therefore, we view the VoC grouping as valuable for distinguishing broad institutional
contexts on aspects such as the political system, framework of corporate governance, education and training
system and legal code (Farndale et al., 2008; Parry et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, in response to Amable (2003) and Brookes et al. (2017), we accept that in order to theorise and
operationalise institutional appropriateness more precisely than previous studies, we should focus on a narrower
range of CMEs. Within CMEs one significant distinction may be drawn between those that have statutory co‐
determination arrangements–the Nordic‐Germanic‐Dutch (NGD) group of CMEs–and those that do not, such as
Belgium and Italy. We focus on NGD‐CMEs. A distinguishing feature of these is the powerful normative role of
collective forms of decision‐making: specifically, the role of works councils is regulated and the role of trade unions,
if not regulated, is highly prescribed. Even in Germany where union membership has fallen in recent years, within
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core sectors of its economy, unions continue to exert considerable influence in determining salaries and conditions.
For example, the IG Metall Engineering Union represents 3.8 million German workers in annual industry‐wide
negotiations that have a significant impact on wage setting in Germany (Lauer, 2016). Thus, a characteristic
feature in NGD‐CME countries is a prescribed partnership culture among employers and employees in relation to
organisational decision‐making through the channels of works councils and trade unions. In this study therefore, we
examine two core collaborative HRM practices in the context of NGD‐CME countries: employer‐employee
communication via works councils and via trade unions.
1.2 | Hypothesis development
We suggest that the level of conformity in the use of HRM practices in MNC subsidiaries depends on the combination
of normative constraints that exist in relation to these particular practices in the subsidiary's home and host envi-
ronments. Using the LME‐CME divide, we put forward a four‐way grouping of different combinations of home and
host institutional settings: Group (1) the home country of the MNC is an LME and the host country of the subsidiary is
another LME;Group (2) the home country of the MNC is an LME and the host country of the subsidiary is a NGD‐CME;
Group (3) the home country of the MNC is a NGD‐CME and the host country of the subsidiary is an LME; andGroup (4)
the home country of the MNC is a NGD‐CME and the host country of the subsidiary is another NGD‐CME.
In Group (1), while no two LMEs are identical, scholars have noted that MNCs from LMEs find it relatively easy
to move into other LMEs as there is less dependence on social institutions and more emphasis on the market
(Morgan, 2012). Thus, we expect subsidiaries of LME MNCs to be able to fully and freely adopt calculative HRM
practices (in our case performance appraisal, employee share schemes and individual performance‐related pay) in
other LMEs. Conversely, we suggest that the collaborative practices of communicating through trade unions and
works councils are unlikely to be used in these subsidiaries as they are not part of the norms of either the home or
host setting. Therefore, we propose:
H1 Subsidiaries of LME MNCs located in other LME settings will adopt calculative HRM practices (performance appraisal,
employee share schemes and individual performance related‐pay) but not collaborative HRM practices (commu-
nicating through trade unions and works councils).
In Group (2) subsidiaries of LME MNCs operating in a NGD‐CME will experience pressure from the home
setting to use calculative HRM in line with the notion that this enhances performance. However, the host NGD‐
CME context will act as a constraint on fully doing so. Individual performance related pay, as a highly individu-
alised calculative practice can be described as a proscriptive norm (something that should not be done) within a
NGD‐CME setting (Bascle, 2016; Poutsma et al., 2006). In contrast, another calculative practice, formal perfor-
mance appraisals, is more acceptable among subsidiaries in CME settings. Although not commonplace in NGD‐
CMEs (Chiang & Birtch, 2010), this is typically seen as ‘best practice’ critical to leveraging human capital to ach-
ieve high organisational performance (e.g., Boxall & Purcell, 2003; Takeuchi et al., 2007). In addition, collective
incentive schemes, such as employee share schemes, are increasingly being diffused into CME settings (Poutsma
et al., 2006) through collective forms of bargaining or management discretion, depending on the regulatory and
fiscal regimes, corporate governance and ownership structures involved. Therefore, given that their headquarters
originate from an LME, MNC subsidiaries will likely take the opportunity to use collective share schemes in a NGD‐
CME setting. The NGD‐CME setting will also exert pressure for conformity to some aspects of collaborative HRM,
particularly those that are mandated by legislation or strong norms. In the case of NGD‐CMEs, legislation in regard
to using works councils for employer‐employee communication is one such pressure. In addition, the use of
communication via trade unions in NGD‐CMEs, while not mandated by law as in using works councils, is also
commonplace among indigenous organisations. Thus, we propose:
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H2 Subsidiaries of LME MNCs operating in a NGD‐CME will adopt the collaborative practices of communicating via works
councils and trade unions; as well as the calculative practices of formal performance appraisals and employee share
schemes; but will avoid the highly calculative practice of individual performance related pay.
In Group (3) subsidiaries of NGD‐CME MNCs operating in an LME are not obliged to employ their home collab-
orative practices in the host setting. Therefore, we expect these subsidiaries to apply intermediate conformity by using
low levels of communication through works councils and trade unions. In relation to calculative practices, while host
LME logics support their application, the strong proscriptive norms in the home NGD‐CME will constrain any incli-
nation to deploy highly calculative practices. Thus, subsidiaries in Group 3 will be less likely to adopt individual per-
formance related pay but will take advantage of their latitude within the LME setting to adopt practices such as formal
performance appraisals and employee share schemes that are more acceptable in their home NGD‐CME. We propose:
H3 Subsidiaries of NGD‐CME MNCs located in an LME will not adopt collaborative practices (communicating via works
councils and trade unions) or the highly calculative practice of performance‐related pay, but will adopt formal
performance appraisals and employee share schemes.
Finally, in Group (4) subsidiaries of NGD‐CME MNCs operating in another NGD‐CME will espouse the local
CME logic of collaborative HRM in using communication through trade unions and works councils. In relation to
calculative HRM, although NGD‐CMEs have generic similarities in relation to the role non‐market institutions play
in supporting the strategic interaction of firms, they also display considerable variation in the specific ways in which
institutions influence company operations (Gooderham et al., 2014). Thus the norms within any two NGD‐CMEs are
not identical. In turn, a subsidiary originating from one and operating in another NGD‐CME will experience
institutional duality, and thus undertake intermediate conformity. We propose that these subsidiaries draw on a
larger repertoire of strategic responses to institutional pressures than those available to purely domestic NGD‐
CME players (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Westney, 1993) by taking the opportunity to differentiate themselves from the
competition through adopting performance‐enhancing calculative practices, such as formal performance appraisals.
According to Iseke and Schneider (2012), norms within the global business community encourage MNEs to adopt
specific practices where possible, including performance management systems, irrespective of the market economy
in the home and host country. However, given their dual NGD‐CME context, the use of pay options that differ-
entiate amongst employees, such as individual pay for performance or employee share schemes, will not be adopted
due to proscriptive norms in both the home and host settings (Poutsma et al., 2006). Thus:
H4 Subsidiaries of NGD‐CME MNCs located in another NGD‐CME will adopt collaborative practices (communicating via
works councils and trade unions) and the calculative practice of performance appraisals; but not performance
related pay or employee share schemes.
In summary, given the combination of home and host institutional logics (NGD‐CME or LME) and the nature of
HRM practices (calculative or collaborative), we argue that MNC subsidiaries will vary in the extent of their
conformity in applying such practices in order to gain legitimacy and differentiate themselves in both contexts.
1.3 | Methods
We use data from the 2014–2016 Cranet comparative survey of HRM policies and practices (see Morley &
Heraty, 2019; Parry et al., 2011). Cranet focuses on factual information regarding organisations and their HRM
policies and is developed using an iterative process based on extant literature and discussions among an inter-
national network of collaborators. It is first developed in English and then, to ensure equivalence, translated/back‐
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translated into the language of each country (Cascio, 2012). Any differences found after the back translation are
reconciled after discussion with the partner in each country, to ensure that the questions retain their intended
meaning. The survey is pilot tested locally (Cushner & Brislin, 1996) and subsequently distributed by the Cranet
representative in each country, to firms with at least 100 employees.
We followed Hall and Soskice's (2001) categorisation of LME and CME countries. The LMEs included were
Australia, the UK and the USA. For CMEs, we focused on the NGD countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden,
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. The sample size consisted of 1196 firms and the response rates among
countries varied between 16% and 23%. We compared answers from the first 10% to those from the last 10% of
respondents and found no evidence of systematic response bias (Cascio, 2012).
Since our data involved a nested structure of 1196 MNC subsidiaries in 10 countries, we used Hierarchical
Linear Modelling (HLM) to test our hypotheses. Unlike regular OLS regression, which would assume independence
of firms within a country, HLM accounts for the fact that firms within a country may be more similar to one another
than firms in other countries, taking into account differences in industry type (Woltman et al., 2012). While
increasing the number of countries included would have improved the robustness of the model, simulation studies
by Austin (2010) and Maas and Hox (2004), suggest that a small number of Level 2 units, for example as few as five,
does not affect the estimations of the regression coefficients and confidence intervals given a large sample size.
1.4 | Variables
Our independent variable was Type of Operation. To create a typology of MNC operations we employed a variable
consisting of four categories (Groups 1–4 above), showing whether a firm originates and/or operates in an LME or
CME. For MNCs subsidiaries in their home country, we have a reference category of indigenous subsidiaries, which
we used as controls.
We employed five dependent variables arising from a set of diagnostic analyses, including PCA and Cronbach's
alpha. For calculative HRM practices, we assessed Formal Performance Appraisal by computing the average of the
use of formal appraisal system (yes/no) among (a) managerial, (b) professional/technical and (c) clerical/manual staff
(Cronbach's alpha 0.868). Our aim was not to differentiate among these types of employees but to explore overall
use of formal performance appraisals. Therefore, we first conducted PCA and Cronbach's alpha analyses to ensure
that these types of employees were part of one principal component with high reliability. When this is the case, it is
common to calculate the average of these options in order to create the new variable (Berenson & Levine, 1989). In
a similar fashion, we computed average scores for both Employee Share Schemes (yes/no) among (a) managerial and
(b) professional/technical (Cronbach's alpha 0.869) and Individual Performance Related Pay (yes/no) among (a)
managerial, (b) professional/technical and (c) clerical/manual staff (Cronbach's alpha 0.811). Initially we included all
three categories of staff in Employee Share schemes and the results remain the same. Subsequently, we removed
clerical/manual staff to focus on the more qualified parts of the workforce as previous research indicates that these
schemes tend to be specifically aimed at these employee categories as a means to binding them to the firm
(Kaarsemaker, Pendleton & Brewster, 2009; Pendleton et al., 2001).
For collaborative HRM practices, we assessed Communication through Trade Unions as an average composite
index (values 0–4) formed from three measures (Cronbach's alpha 0.858): (a) extent to which trade unions influence
organisation (0–4); (b) extent of use of trade unions to communicate major issues (i) from management to em-
ployees (0–4) and (ii) from employees to management (0–4). Communication through Works Councils was an average
composite index (values 0–4) formed from two measures (Cronbach's alpha 0.883): extent of use of works councils
to communicate major issues (a) from management to employees (0–4) and (b) from employees to management
(0–4).
We controlled for several factors that could influence the adoption of HRM practices. Strategic Position of HRM
(SHRM) (values 0–3) comprised three dichotomous measures: whether the person with responsibility for HRM had
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a seat on the Board or equivalent (0 = no, 1 = yes); in the cases where the organisation had a business/service
strategy, whether the person responsible for HRM was involved in its development from the outset (1 = yes,
0 = no); and whether line management views were considered for the evaluation of the HR function (1 = consid-
ered, 0 = not‐considered). Industry was operationalised as services (1) or manufacturing (0). In the questionnaire,
this question used the NACE classification of main sector of industry. We subsequently collapsed this classification
into these two sectors and excluded any parts of the classification that did not clearly belong in one of these two.
Headquarters (HQ) denotes whether the respondent firm is the headquarters (1) or not (0). Finally, Organisational
Size was measured as the ln function of employees and subsequently standardised.
2 | RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptives and bivariate relationships. These support our assertion that calculative HRM
practices are more common in organisations indigenous to LMEs and collaborative practices are more common in
organisations indigenous to NGD‐CMEs (Table 2).
Next, we tested our hypotheses through HLM and controlled for Strategic Position of HRM (SHRM), Industry,
Headquarters (HQ) and Organisational Size. The covariance parameters for the random effects are statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.10), suggesting the contribution of these effects warrants them remaining in the model. In Table 2a,
we use operations indigenous to NGD‐CME settings as the reference category and test the calculative HRM
practices across the different Types of Operation. According to this table, Formal Performance Appraisals are more
likely in all other Types of Operations; Employee Share Schemes are more likely in firms originating in an LME setting,
irrespective of setting of operation; Individual Performance Related Pay is more likely only in LME settings, both of
origin and operation.
Next, we conducted the same analysis for the collaborative HRM practices, using operations indigenous to LME
settings as the reference category of Type of Operation. According to Table 2b, Communication through Works
Councils is more likely in firms operating in NGD‐CME settings only, regardless of setting of origin. Furthermore,
Communication through Trade Unions is more likely in firms operating in and originating from NGD‐CME settings.
H1 was supported as MNC subsidiaries originating in LMEs and operating in other LMEs were most likely to adopt
performance appraisal, employee share schemes and individual performance related‐pay. Further, they did not
adopt the practice of communicating through trade unions and works councils. H2 is partially supported as MNC
subsidiaries originating in an LME and operating in a NGD‐CME (a) avoided individual performance related pay; (b)
adopted formal performance appraisals and employee share schemes (c) but adopted communication only via works
councils, not trade unions. H3 was partially supported. In line with our hypothesis, MNC subsidiaries originating in a
NGD‐CME and operating in an LME did not adopt either of the collaborative HRM practices nor performance related
pay, but they also adopted formal performance appraisals. However, they did not, as we postulated, adopt
employee share schemes. Finally, H4 was supported as MNC subsidiaries originating in a NGD‐CME and operating in
another NGD‐CME (a) adopted both collaborative practices; (b) did not adopt performance related pay or employee
share schemes; and (c) deviated from host NGD‐CME logics by adopting performance appraisals.
3 | DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we have contributed to the on‐going debate on how MNCs respond to institutional duality arising
from variations in both their home and host contexts when deciding on which HRM practices to adopt. We build on
the idea of a ‘mixed’ approach in relation to adopting HRM practices in subsidiaries of MNCs (Farndale et al., 2017)
and also on arguments that MNC subsidiaries that experience institutional duality adopt intermediate conformity
(Bascle, 2016). Our operationalisation of duality as a set of combinations of LME and NGD‐CME home and host
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contexts has allowed us to move beyond previous literature and suggest that duality will present a different range
of both constraints and opportunities for subsidiaries based upon a variety of norms within the home and host
contexts. Suggesting that, given their home context, subsidiary responses to operating in host LME and NGD‐CME
contexts are substantially different, we have included both LMEs and NGD‐CMEs as home and host contexts, which
allows us to examine how different characterisations of institutional duality affect the adoption of individual HRM
practices.
We support previous research that MNC subsidiaries that both originate and operate in LMEs adapt to their
new context with relative ease (Morgan, 2012). In the absence of strong social institutions, and with a focus on the
market, these subsidiaries pursue similar calculative HRM practices to those that operate in their home environ-
ment to enhance differentiation via individual performance (Poutsma, et al., 2006; Morgan, 2012), while eschewing
collaborative practices as these are not needed in order to conform to their institutional context.
Subsidiaries originating in LMEs and operating in NGD‐CMEs conform to their host context by adopting
communication via works councils but not communication via trade unions, suggesting that this practice might not
TAB L E 2A HLM Analysis of Type of Operation (indigenous CME as reference category)








FIXED Effects Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Intercept 0.59 ))) 0.06 0.07) 0.04 0.40 ))) 0.06
Type of operation
Operate LME, origin CME 0.29 ) 0.13 −0.15 0.12 0.08 0.16
Operate LME, origin LME 0.32 )) 0.10 0.22 )) 0.07 0.22 ) 0.10
Operate CME, origin CME 0.10 )) 0.05 0.03 0.05 −0.04 0.06
Operate CME, origin LME 0.18 ))) 0.05 0.17 ))) 0.05 0.11 0.06
Indigenous LME operations 0.31 ))) 0.07 0.11 )) 0.03 0.22 )) 0.06
Indigenous CME operations (reference category) 0 0 0
Industry (0 = products, 1 = services) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.09 ) 0.04
Headquarters (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.10 ) 0.04 0.11 ) 0.04 0.12 )) 0.06
Firm size (ln) 0.04 )) 0.01 0.05 ))) 0.01 0.03 0.02
Strategic position of HRM (SHRM) 0.06 ))) 0.01 0.03 )) 0.01 0.04 )) 0.01
RANDOM Effects
σ2ε 0.11
*** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.00 0.16 *** 0.01
σ2 0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 a 0.00
Information criteria (−2 restricted log likelihood) 678.76 510.60 956.48
Note: CME's are limited to NGD‐CME countries.
Abbreviations: CME, Coordinated Market Economy; HRM, Human resource management; LME, Liberal Market Economy;
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be as prescriptive (Bascle, 2016) within NGD‐CMEs as expected. A weakening of the position of trade unions in
NGD‐CMEs and with it their ability to impose themselves as institutional regulators may explain this. For these
subsidiaries, calculative HRM is also constrained by the host environment. They are thus unlikely to use highly
calculative practices (e.g., of individual performance related pay), but are likely to use other calculative practices
that are more institutionally acceptable (e.g., employee share schemes and performance appraisals), which can
differentiate them within the CME setting (Poutsma et al., 2006).
These results support previous suggestions that subsidiaries of MNCs consider the ‘relative strength of
competing forces regulating their behaviour’ (Brewster et al., 2008, pp. 333) and use the discretion available to
them to make decisions about which norms to comply with (Bascle, 2016; Kostova et al., 2008), but suggest that
subsidiaries seek to also maintain their competitive advantage through using performance‐enhancing (calculative)
practices where possible.
Subsidiaries originating in NGD‐CMEs and operating in LMEs avoided collaborative practices and individual
performance related pay but adopted performance appraisals. They did not, as expected, adopt high levels of
employee share schemes. This suggests that these firms use their agency as subsidiaries of MNCs to discard
collaborative practices and adopt those calculative HRM practices that allow them to function competitively in
market‐based economies.
TAB L E 2B HLM Analysis of Type of Operation (indigenous LME as reference category)





FIXED Effects Est. SE Est. SE
Intercept 0.45 0.26 0.40 0.23
Type of operation
Operate LME, origin CME 0.03 0.29 0.44 0.38
Operate LME, origin LME 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.23
Operate CME, origin CME 0.69 * 0.30 0.83 ** 0.27
Operate CME, origin LME 0.47 0.30 1.03 *** 0.27
Indigenous CME operations 0.73 ** 0.28 1.00 *** 0.23
Indigenous LME operations (reference category) 0 0
Industry (0 = products, 1 = services) 0.24 0.16 −0.33 * 0.14
Headquarters (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.24 * 0.11 −0.23 0.14
Firm size (ln) 0.20 *** 0.30 0.28 *** 0.04
Strategic position of HRM (SHRM) 0.07 * 0.03 0.11 ** 0.04
RANDOM Effects
σ2ε 0.65
*** 0.03 1.03 *** 0.05
σ2 0.10 ** 0.03 0.06 * 0.03
Information criteria (−2 restricted log likelihood) 2161.63 2603.68
Note: CME's are limited to NGD‐CME countries.
Abbreviations: CME, Coordinated Market Economy; HRM, Human resource management; LME, Liberal Market Economy;
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Finally, MNC subsidiaries originating in NGD‐CMEs and operating in other NGD‐CMEs seek legitimacy in both
their country of origin and operation by adopting collaborative HRM practices and avoiding individual performance
related pay and employee share schemes. However, despite their dual NGD‐CME contexts these subsidiaries also
adopted performance appraisal, a calculative practice more commonly associated with market‐driven LMEs. This
suggests that not only do subsidiaries from NGD‐CMEs take advantage of freedoms within an LME host context to
adopt some performance‐based practices and learn about market‐relations (Morgan, 2012) but also that NGD‐
CMEs entering other NGD‐CMEs will use the latitude available to them (Oliver, 1991) to introduce novel HRM
practices by mixing headquarter and local models (Morgan, 2017). Thus, NGD‐CMEs will retain those practices (or
absence of practices) that are required to maintain legitimacy but will also adopt performance‐based practices in an
attempt to drive competitive advantage. These findings lead us to question the common description of simple
‘trade‐offs and compromises between competing pressures and influences’ (Brewster et al., 2008, p. 333) and
support a focus on the agency of the firm in making decisions in light of institutional constraints and opportunities,
rather than a more fatalistic view of local isomorphism.
We move existing arguments forward in three ways. First, we support previous evidence that a subsidiary's
decisions in relation to HRM practices are best explained in relation to institutional duality (Brewster et al., 2008),
rather than other perspectives that favour a country of origin (Ferner et al., 2013), host country (Rosenzweig &
Nohria, 1994) or best practice effect (Edwards et al., 2013; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). We show that, rather than
conformity with either the home or host context, the combination of contexts drives the choice of HRM practices
adopted by the MNC subsidiary. Our study therefore empirically supports the idea of intermediate conformity
(Bascle, 2016) but develops this idea by attempting to understand the drivers behind the choice of individual
practices, in relation to the mix of host and home country logics (Farndale et al., 2017; Morgan, 2001).
Second, we add to existing theoretical understanding of institutional duality itself. Duality involves more than
simply competing pressures for institutional isomorphism from the home and host (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Rather,
it is a complex intersection of the constraints and opportunities available in the home and host contexts. Crucially,
these opportunities arise not only from the move of MNCs from CMEs into less constrictive LMEs, but also from
the existence of institutional duality itself for MNCs moving from one CME into another CME. Indeed, differences
between restrictions in different CME settings provide opportunities for MNCs to use their agency to adopt
practices from outside of both home or host logics.
We give expression to the capacity of institutions to serve as both mechanisms of constraint and as ‘oppor-
tunity providers’ (Rana & Morgan, 2019, p. 514). In addition to engaging dynamically between global integration
and local responsiveness in order to react to the expectations of their host context and the transfer of practices
from headquarters (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006), subsidiaries might also have the latitude to resist institutional
constraints and choose HR practices that do not conform with either the home or host context (Oliver, 1991;
Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). Thus, we could conceptualise the MNC as a transnational community (Morgan, 2001,
2017) in which it not only makes choices between practices that conform to home or host logics but actually
chooses from a wider repertoire of practices depending on the strength of institutional forces and their ambition to
improve its competitive advantage through performance enhancing practices.
Finally, we extend existing literature to suggest that the treatment of duality requires not only consideration of
this combination of home and host contexts but also of the individual practices being discussed. From a practice
perspective, we argue that this mix of considerations stands closer to the experience of managers in MNCs on the
ground that they seek to reconcile possibly competing norms, achieve a strategic balance in responding to
contextual requirements and leverage particular HRM recipes. In seeking out this strategic balance (Deep-
house, 1999), they will, where possible, exercise the agency available to them arising from the resources they
possess or can acquire.
Considering these three points in tandem, our work moves beyond Brewster et al. (2008) to paint a picture of
management decisions within contexts of institutional duality as being more complex than previous literature has
suggested. Our results illustrate that institutional duality presents a variety of practice adoption options, not only
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depending on the combination of home and host contexts and the particular HRM practice in question, but also on
the motivation of MNCs to exploit available latitude.
4 | LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
We accept that the need to extend the VoC framework beyond advanced economies (Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Witt
et al., 2018) presents one limitation of our study. Further, we have not undertaken a detailed examination of state‐
level institutions or of the nature of specific constraints or opportunities within each country setting. To test our
hypotheses, the number of practices we have selected is small (albeit they are core HRM practices) so future
research should establish whether our results are replicated with a larger repertoire of HRM practices. In addition,
we did not compare foreign operations of the same MNC, something which future studies could usefully explore.
Finally, our study was cross‐sectional and utilised responses from the single most senior HR manager in each
subsidiary. Arguably, future studies could include multiple respondents or other additional information sources.
Future research could also usefully build on our ideas regarding the nature of duality to analyse how specific
institutional factors such as laws, policies or norms affect the utilisation of specific HRM practices. Scholars might
also examine institutional logics at other levels, such as at sector or occupational level. Furthermore, future
research designs could add performance outcomes to the proposed relationships to explore the national and
organisational conditions under which MNC subsidiaries achieve competitive advantage in relation to their
indigenous counterparts through their choice of HRM practices.
Our results provide some indication of how leaders within subsidiaries of MNCs make decisions regarding the
HRM practices that they adopt. However, it would be useful to undertake more in‐depth research around how
leaders actually make these decisions. Practice adoption is likely to be a far more complex process than this
quantitative analysis can capture, thus a qualitative analysis that considers aspects, such as relationships and
politics within and across subsidiaries might enrich our knowledge in this area (Ferner et al., 2012).
Research might also expand the specific institutional contexts used to include settings beyond the LME and
NGD‐CME dichotomy. Given that works councils are collaborative institutional arrangements that are primarily
features of NGD‐CMEs this will involve incorporating less formalised means of employer‐employee communication.
This would pave the way for comparative analyses of the HRM practices applied by LME and CME MNCs in their
respective subsidiaries in emerging and transition economies. In addition, we recognise that our study focuses only
on the developed world and that further research might examine subsidiaries of MNCs from emerging economies
such as China, Brazil or India, in light of evidence that they follow distinct paths to internationalisation (e.g.
Deng, 2012).
Our study has important implications for MNC managers and their understanding of the mechanisms behind
MNC practice. MNCs have to confront national level influences when developing consistent HRM practices across
their operations. Managers of MNCs continually face pressures to readjust their HRM systems in order to operate
in a global context. They do so in the midst of a continuing debate on standardisation versus localisation (Lazarova
et al, 2016). In turn, HR and line managers need to be adequately trained to handle such readjustments effectively.
They may also need to establish organisational policies specific to the institutional settings in which the firm
operates. The results of this study may help them in this endeavour. For example, understanding the differences
between LME and NGD‐CME settings and the constraints or opportunities of moving from an LME to a NGD‐CME
and vice versa, or recognising the idiosyncrasies of different NGD‐CME settings, could enable management in
MNCs to more effectively deploy HRM provisions across institutional settings. Finally, our findings indicate pro-
scribed and prescribed single HRM practices across a range of contexts, suggesting that managers of MNCs should
consider the notion of ‘intermediate conformity’ as a guide to negotiating the implementation of HRM practices and
policies that may be less common but yet acceptable in the subsidiary setting.
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APPENDIX
Complementary Analysis to i l lustrate differences among Type of Organisation and each HRM
Practice
T A B L E A1 ANOVA Between HRM Practices and Type of Operation
Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
Formal Performance Appraisal Between groups 23,34 5 4,67 36,41 0,00
Within groups 152,72 1191 0,13
Total 176,06 1196
Employee share schemes Between groups 4,79 5 0,96 9,37 0,00
Within groups 113,27 1108 0,10
Total 118,06 1113
Individual performance related pay Between groups 6,35 5 1,27 7,21 0,00
Within groups 200,19 1137 0,18
Total 206,54 1142
Communication through trade unions Between groups 119,33 5 23,87 27,31 0,00
Within groups 1036,54 1186 0,87
Total 1155,87 1191
Communication through works councils Between groups 330,05 5 66,01 55,34 0,00
Within groups 1400,50 1174 1,19
Total 1730,56 1179
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
Abbreviation: HRM, Human resource management.
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